Microsoft HK 明串Firefox速度慢(IE9 Launch Tour)

[youtube=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kcsUBM2onFE]

Demo Transcript

大家左手邊見到嗰個就係Chrome 6嚟嘅,Chrome 7其實Google都唔係好贊成download,所以我哋今日用用Chrome 6俾大家睇。右手邊就係IE9,我哋今日出街,個錶你會見到20條魚,我們仲可以做到60個frame per second,即係話而家每一秒鐘可以有幾多個頁面,越多即係越快。隔離20條魚淨係十五十六咁,都已經唔係好游o架嘞,啲魚都呆滯咗o架嘞。咁所以呢,其實你可能話:「嘩,咁你IE9咪好犀利?可唔可以俾個叻嘅,你攞Chrome嚟比,咁樣實贏啦你。可唔可以攞Firefox呀,你咁勁。」好,咁我哋就滿足大家嘅需求啦,就俾個Firefox大家睇下嘅。

首先呢,為表公允呢,大家都知道Firefox有唔同嘅版本o架嘞,呢個就係Firefox專為咗迎接我哋IE9出世,所以前日特登掉出街嘅4.0 beta 6嚟嘅,特登前日出嘅,OK?唔緊要,咁呢,硬解已經啟動,你見Direct 2D enabled同埋Direct enabled,OK?我哋唔係話特登熄咗啲嘢去呃大家。好嘞,既然大家同一個有硬解嘅情況底下,咁我哋睇下啲魚魚到底有幾勁嘞。嗱呢啲code呢,其實都唔係一啲特別嘅coding,係HTML5 code嚟o架啫,咁所以係同一個code,我哋唔係話特別寫俾IE嘅。

20條魚,大家非常之開心,係咪呀?60個frame per second,綽綽有餘,兩個都叻叻哋嘅,OK?我哋不如一嚟就嚟1000條魚囉……

好嘞,咁你見到個Firefox已經開始跌到去6呀、7呀、5呀,4個frame for second,啲魚都開始呆滯,雖然個金魚缸好窄。我哋睇睇右手邊嘅IE呢,22、23、25、26,綽綽有餘,依然啲魚都郁嘅,OK?完全冇花冇假,我哋喺硬解上面,好肯定係比Firefox寫得好。

其實如果你哋心水清都知,其實Firefox喺前兩個beta,佢哋硬解by default係disable o架。如果你哋玩過都知,係要落去搞兩三個retendering嘅setting先至開番o架。其實如果佢咁有信心,by default就唔駛disable啦。OK?所以其實你哋見到佢哋依然都仲有一段路去努力嘅,不過唔緊要!我哋非常之歡迎大家一齊努力嘅

好,跟住呢,我哋不如再睇睇第二個demo喇喎。其實頭先我咪成日話嘅,嘩,如果有朝一日,網頁好似apps咁,咁就發達喇,咁又可以有apps嘅好處,又可以有網頁嘅好處。

如果大家見過呢個咁嘅Amazon嘅bookshelf呢,都有啲印象嘞,iPhone實裝過啦呢個apps,iPad嗰啲實有o架啦。其實呢,網頁絕對可以做到同你個apps一模一樣嘅畫面,一模一樣嘅嘢,點解大家唔用網頁嚟做,take佢嘅好處呢?就係因為咁嘞,譬如睇睇Chrome呢邊先啦,我想買呢本書喎……咁樣跌出嚟嘅,你係用戶都唔會用啦。你睇下,慢動作揭書嘅。

睇睇如果我哋用support硬解嘅IE9會點吖嗱。同一本書……OK?所以你會見到呢,完全同一個local apps係冇分別o架。所以其實我哋只要可以啟動到你個CPU,你個電腦一啲未開啟嘅功能,我哋絕對可以有網頁嘅好處,唔駛download,亦都可以做到apps嘅效果,OK?完全係真嘅,你見。

好嘞,跟住第三樣嘢想俾你哋睇嘅呢就係,一個我哋為咗要迎接將來,你知啦,而家網頁越嚟越多嗰啲我哋叫做多媒體啦、高清片啦,咁到底browser頂唔頂到高清片呢?我哋同IMDb其實合作咗一個小小嘅demo。你而家睇到呢個係Chrome嚟嘅,你見呢,都順嘅,不過都好似窒下窒下咁,你見我都未入去睇片嘞,OK?50零個frame per second咁啦,咁可以揀戲啦。

好嘞,如果我哋用IE9,到底可以有幾smooth呢其實……你見係完一路60個frame per second,係冇郁過,同埋好smooth可以揀戲嘅。甚至乎呢,譬如我哋播呢條《Despicable Me》啦,未上o架呢套戲好似,其實呢個trailer已經係一條全高清嘅trailer嚟o架嘞……好嘞呢啲留番俾錢入戲院睇嘞。

所以你見到呢,其實只要你能夠啟動到硬解功能,無論一啲高清片,其實仍然都綽綽有餘o架。同埋頭先你見到啦,頭先我點解用Firefox,唔用Chrome同埋IE呢?因為其實Firefox仲未支援H.264 encoding,所以其實都係一件幾失望嘅事嚟o架。因為我哋都好肯定將來嘅standard,如無意外都應該H.264 on internet係一個最好嘅compression rate。不過唔緊要啦,希望大家同業繼續努力啦!

好,除咗睇完快之餘呢,想同大家睇下另外一個我哋設計IE嘅目的嘞,就係為咗clean嘞。頭先成日強調話,喂……

如果大家想親身試試IE9的速度,請到以下連結:
http://www.microsoft.com/hk/ie9

Microsoft:我們的「Windows」沒有被Apple愛好者騎劫!

為了推廣新作業系統Windows 7,Microsoft在全球大掟廣告銀彈,包括在紐約的Sakes Fifth Avenue商店建立了一個電腦為主題的的Windows(櫥窗)。

特別的是,這個櫥窗也顯示了一個即時twitter feed,將所有hashtag用了#holidaywindows 的twitter即時呈現出來。這個做法的原意,是希望讓客戶在Microsoft贊助的櫥窗分享他們的節日願望。

不幸的是,這個Twitter櫥窗卻被Apple愛好者視為捉弄Microsoft的好機會,他們試圖將櫥窗換成用來促銷Apple電腦,方法包括:

– 發佈(hashtag #holidaywindows)指出Windows漏洞。
– 鼓吹Apple的穩定性,聖誕節必買一台Apple電腦。
– 用Windows而不用Mac的是精神病迹象。
– Windows 7是Apple的點子,買Apple吧!

過了不久,以上的行徑終被Microsoft給發現了,他們不甘示弱,並且出了這樣一封告示:

必須指出,該櫥窗是Saks Fifth Avenue的私有財產。因此,我們已經按放了過濾系統,以確保其中Twitter內容是適合讓廣大公眾閱讀並附合假期主題。該過濾器包括過濾任何不符合假期主題的負面評論及垃圾訊息。櫥窗從沒有以任何方式被騎劫。

唉,冤冤相報何時了?

趕上雲端尾班車

微軟CEO Steve Ballmer寫了一封給客戶的電郵,內容大意是:「親愛的客戶,我們終於推出Cloud computing平台了。」

Cloud computing借靠互聯網的威力,把那些複雜的運算,分拆成無數細小的程序,交由多部網絡伺服器組成的系統處理,以取代往昔單靠個人電腦的某個軟件處 理的做法。舉個例,像我們已很少再用電郵軟件了,因為像Gmail那些網上電郵的可用性和效率實在太超班了,沒有騙你,思哲現在連辦公電郵亦使以 Gmail代理,在家在外,檢查幾個不同的電郵帳號,完全依賴Gmail去處理。沒法子,我已失去耐性忍受Outlook的笨拙和遲緩。

事實上,早於微軟涉足Cloud computing,別人例如Amazon和Google已一早搶佔了先機。眼看自己的個人運算王朝「日漸衰落」,微軟是沒辦法才逼於下這步棋。現在 Windows還是主流的個人電腦作業系統,大幅度抱離Mac,但仗著其他範疇的收入,例如iPhone和iPods,Apple的年收入快要跟微軟看齊 了,相反食老本的微軟,收入增長卻一直裏足不前。

過去十幾年,除了金融風暴金融海嘯之外,我們的世界比較有看頭的大變化,互聯網革命肯定是其中之一,不管是Cloud computing還是social networking,都在靜俏俏地影響和改變人類的生活模式。

然而,Steve Ballmer卻認為,現在還缺少了「無縫地融合」各種裝置各類平台技術,因此推出名為Azure的Cloud computing平台。Azure的質素如何,能否討開發者的喜,現在還言之尚早,但思哲認為,產品質素不是唯一的決定勝因素,想想今天Windows 還霸著一大片市場,你就會理解此話的箇中道理。既然如此,真正決定勝負的是什麼呢?

Best product don’t necessary win. ─ 《Rules for Revolutionaries, Guy Kawasaki》

《2008年10月30日刊於蘋果日報》

延伸
在洛杉磯舉行的Professional Developers Conference 2008 (PDC 2008),Ray Ozziey於主題演講中公布了Windows Azure,並於會場中首次公開示範 Windows 7。

Microsoft以優惠券反攻Google

[youtube=http://hk.youtube.com/watch?v=delQPYR2XMk]

我不是精打細算的人,翻揭報章或雜誌,很少剪下那些優惠券。對商戶而言,給予報章雜誌優惠券,宣傳作用大,能促使潛在顧客前去消費。對媒體而言,刊登優惠券某程度上更是銷量的保證,因為有些時候,持有優惠券能省下的錢,隨時超過了報章雜誌本身的零售價。

最近,一直被Google壓住打的Microsoft,在其搜尋引擎平台推出Live Search Cashback,這個類似優惠券概念的廣告模式,Bill Gates是這樣子作介紹:「一直以來,廣告商接觸搜尋引擎使用者的方式,主要是靠CPC(Cost-Per-Click)這個模式,亦即每次有人點擊廣告連結,廣告商就得付出若干費用,不管該用戶最終有沒有購物消費。」「Live Search Cashback是CPA(Cost-Per-Action)的模式,不同的是,廣告商只在搜尋引擎使用者進行消費之後,才需要付出若干費用。」

跟優惠券最不同之處,是每當有人透過Cashback消費,商戶均會付予Microsoft若干的佣金。他們這次也似乎胸有成竹,包括eBay、Barnes & Noble在內,他們一共拉攏了超過700個互聯網商貿網站。為急於搶奪市場,並帶動了其CPC業務,Microsoft決定把佣金全數回贈予消費者。我覺得Cashback像手機回贈,也像送家電簽約固網。與其說這是個商業模式,倒不如說成營銷策略更貼切。

我認為不管是CPC、CPA、優惠券還是地鐵站八達通,它們都在取替昔日的分類廣告和派傳單之類的模式。Google收入主要來自CPC,現在不理用戶最終有否消費,他們亦穩袋每年200億美金的廣告收入,不管那個模式,最終離不開如何準確地傳遞訊息,說到尾這又是一齣新舊媒體交接的戲碼。

《2008年5月23日刊於蘋果日報》

Yahoo-Microsoft合併失敗



終於,Steve Ballmer放棄了跟Yahoo糾纏下去,宣佈撤銷收購。可以想像,Yahoo的股價馬上就要崩潰。

在一月底,Microsoft提出以31美元收購,Yahoo還價40美元。過了不久,Microsoft提價至33美元,Yahoo也降價至37美元,然而最終還是談不攏。要知道,從收購消息傳出那天起,Yahoo股價已經升了不少,現在暫撤收購,Yahoo馬上就要打回原形。下一次Microsoft再出價,很可能連30美元也沒有了。

有分析員說,Yahoo管理層不肯接受收購,他們並沒有將股東利益放在首位,楊致遠應為此負責。不過,事實上如果microsoft很有把握,大可以出動敵意收購來叫楊致遠為首的管理層屈服。

較早時候,Microsoft曾考慮計劃運用3千萬美元預算,設立proxy fight來對抗yahoo管理層。只不過,今次Microsoft留下重回談判桌的伏線,講明將不取採敵意收購。最主要的原因,可能就是Microsoft知道敵意收購的勝算不高,而且proxy fight一旦開始了就是拖時間的訴訟期,到頭來需要和解,還不外乎又是出價。

要知道,用Ballmer 致電楊致遠那天起的Yahoo收市價及Microsoft最終33美元收購價計算,Yahoo股東們本應得到逾70%的premium。再說,Yahoo沒有制訂長遠策略的能力,楊致遠為「抵抗」Microsoft的收購,不惜宣佈試驗以Google Adsense取代自家的Panama,形同斷送Yahoo的前程,網友更在思哲博客留言說:「Google才是Yahoo最大的敵人啊,飲鴆止渴,悲哀!

今日開市,不知Yahoo股價會跌得幾甘呢?

下為Ballmer寫給楊致遠「答謝信」,字裡有骨,唔知Jerry睇完有咩感覺呢?

May 3, 2008

Mr. Jerry Yang
CEO and Chief Yahoo
Yahoo! Inc.
701 First Avenue
Sunnyvale, CA 94089

Dear Jerry:

After over three months, we have reached the conclusion of the process regarding a possible combination of Microsoft and Yahoo!.

I first want to convey my personal thanks to you, your management team, and Yahoo!’s Board of Directors for your consideration of our proposal. I appreciate the time and attention all of you have given to this matter, and I especially appreciate the time that you have invested personally. I feel that our discussions this week have been particularly useful, providing me for the first time with real clarity on what is and is not possible.

I am disappointed that Yahoo! has not moved towards accepting our offer. I first called you with our offer on January 31 because I believed that a combination of our two companies would have created real value for our respective shareholders and would have provided consumers, publishers, and advertisers with greater innovation and choice in the marketplace. Our decision to offer a 62 percent premium at that time reflected the strength of these convictions.

In our conversations this week, we conveyed our willingness to raise our offer to $33.00 per share, reflecting again our belief in this collective opportunity. This increase would have added approximately another $5 billion of value to your shareholders, compared to the current value of our initial offer. It also would have reflected a premium of over 70 percent compared to the price at which your stock closed on January 31. Yet it has proven insufficient, as your final position insisted on Microsoft paying yet another $5 billion or more, or at least another $4 per share above our $33.00 offer.

Also, after giving this week’s conversations further thought, it is clear to me that it is not sensible for Microsoft to take our offer directly to your shareholders. This approach would necessarily involve a protracted proxy contest and eventually an exchange offer. Our discussions with you have led us to conclude that, in the interim, you would take steps that would make Yahoo! undesirable as an acquisition for Microsoft.

We regard with particular concern your apparent planning to respond to a “hostile” bid by pursuing a new arrangement that would involve or lead to the outsourcing to Google of key paid Internet search terms offered by Yahoo! today. In our view, such an arrangement with the dominant search provider would make an acquisition of Yahoo! undesirable to us for a number of reasons:

• First, it would fundamentally undermine Yahoo!’s own strategy and long-term viability by encouraging advertisers to use Google as opposed to your Panama paid search system. This would also fragment your search advertising and display advertising strategies and the ecosystem surrounding them. This would undermine the reliance on your display advertising business to fuel future growth.

• Given this, it would impair Yahoo’s ability to retain the talented engineers working on advertising systems that are important to our interest in a combination of our companies.

• In addition, it would raise a host of regulatory and legal problems that no acquirer, including Microsoft, would want to inherit. Among other things, this would consolidate market share with the already-dominant paid search provider in a manner that would reduce competition and choice in the marketplace.

• This would also effectively enable Google to set the prices for key search terms on both their and your search platforms and, in the process, raise prices charged to advertisers on Yahoo. In addition to whatever resulting legal problems, this seems unwise from a business perspective unless in fact one simply wishes to use this as a vehicle to exit the paid search business in favor of Google.

• It could foreclose any chance of a combination with any other search provider that is not already relying on Google’s search services.

Accordingly, your apparent plan to pursue such an arrangement in the event of a proxy contest or exchange offer leads me to the firm decision not to pursue such a path. Instead, I hereby formally withdraw Microsoft’s proposal to acquire Yahoo!.

We will move forward and will continue to innovate and grow our business at Microsoft with the talented team we have in place and potentially through strategic transactions with other business partners.

I still believe even today that our offer remains the only alternative put forward that provides your stockholders full and fair value for their shares. By failing to reach an agreement with us, you and your stockholders have left significant value on the table.

But clearly a deal is not to be.

Thank you again for the time we have spent together discussing this.

Sincerely yours,

Steven A. Ballmer
Chief Executive Officer
Microsoft Corporation

Rich List 2008

Rank

Name

Citizenship

Age

Net Worth ($bil)

1

Warren Buffett United States

77

62

2

Carlos Slim Helu & family Mexico

68

60

3

Bill Gates United States

52

58

4

Lakshmi Mittal India

57

45

5

Mukesh Ambani India

50

43

6

Anil Ambani India

48

42

7

Ingvar Kamprad & family Sweden

81

31

8

KP Singh India

76

30

9

Oleg Deripaska Russia

40

28

10

Karl Albrecht Germany

88

27

11

Li Ka-shing Hong Kong

79

26.5

12

Sheldon Adelson United States

74

26

13

Bernard Arnault France

59

25.5

14

Lawrence Ellison United States

63

25

15

Roman Abramovich Russia

41

23.5

16

Theo Albrecht Germany

85

23

17

Liliane Bettencourt France

85

22.9

18

Alexei Mordashov Russia

42

21.2

19

Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Alsaud Saudi Arabia

51

21

20

Mikhail Fridman Russia

43

20.8

21

Vladimir Lisin Russia

51

20.3

22

Amancio Ortega Spain

72

20.2

23

Raymond, Thomas & Walter Kwok Hong Kong

NA

19.9

24

Mikhail Prokhorov Russia

42

19.5

25

Vladimir Potanin Russia

47

19.3

26

Christy Walton & family United States

53

19.2

26

Jim Walton United States

60

19.2

26

S Robson Walton United States

64

19.2

29

Lee Shau Kee Hong Kong

80

19

29

Alice Walton United States

58

19

31

David Thomson & family Canada

50

18.9

32

Sergey Brin United States

34

18.7

33

Larry Page United States

35

18.6

34

Michael Otto & family Germany

64

18.2

35

Stefan Persson Sweden

60

17.7

36

Suleiman Kerimov Russia

42

17.5

37

Charles Koch United States

72

17

37

David Koch United States

67

17

39

Francois Pinault & family France

71

16.9

40

Michael Dell United States

43

16.4

41

Paul Allen United States

55

16

41

Kirk Kerkorian United States

90

16

43

Steven Ballmer United States

52

15

43

Abigail Johnson United States

46

15

43

Shashi & Ravi Ruia India

NA

15

46

Nasser Al-Kharafi & family Kuwait

64

14

46

Gerald Cavendish Grosvenor & family United Kingdom

56

14

46

Carl Icahn United States

72

14

46

Forrest Mars Jr United States

76

14

46

Jacqueline Mars United States

68

14

765

Mark Zuckerberg United States

23

1.5

儲存制式之最後武士


報稱,高清制式之戰,Toshiba一方正式向Sony投降。

隨即上Amazon,見一部HD-DVD播放器,售約150美元,只是Blu-ray播放器售價的一半,再說,兼容Blu-ray的PS3,其在美銷售,向來亦不及支援HD-DVD的XBox360,因此思哲不理解美國消費者投票予Blu-ray的理由。不過,無論如何,Sony的股價,總算有望走出年初以來的低谷。

儲存制式之爭,一戰經年,若再拖下去,姑勿論勝方是誰,都是慘勝。因為無論如何,數碼時代下,最後的贏家也只會是硬碟。然而,沒人知道這天到底甚麼時候到臨,正如沒有人知道19世紀中期的日本,明治維新突發而出,一下子廢除了武士道,訓練現代化軍隊,並大規模發展軍火工業。

基本上,儲存制式的明治維新,近年已開始醞釀,其中以美國最領先。YouTube的出現,開創了「毋須燒碟」的局面,影像的儲存及分享,不用靠實體的儲存媒介,使用效率卻有增無減。再說,這一代的網絡使用者,尤其年輕人,已適應了一個任何資訊或影像隨click隨有的世界,即使目前買碟租碟仍是主流消費模式,但當這幫人逐漸成為主流消費者,他們還能忍受外出買碟和租碟嗎?

頻寬是另一個有利因素。以香港為例,寬頻滲透率高,透過本地的光纖網絡,傳送高清影片,那絕對不成問題。問題是消費者並未習慣於電腦屏幕收看電影和電視節目。事實上,一台1080p的40吋平面高清電視的user experience,當然肯定勝於17吋的電腦顯示屏。

不過,隨數碼廣播的開始,數碼機頂盒亦開始流行。舉個例,蘋果設計的AppleTV也是數碼機頂盒的一種,其任務是把電腦的數碼影像和電視機連接起來。雖有分析員批評,AppleTV乃蘋果近年少有的失敗之作,無可否認的是,支援互聯網內容的機頂盒市場,已進入初期發展的階段。

硬碟取代影碟成為主流的日子,我看不出十年,Blu-ray將會是暮日之下一位戰到最後的最強武士。

2007年2月18日刊於《蘋果日報》

Yahoo!敬酒唔飲

A bad agreement is better than a good lawsuit. ─ 意大利諺語

Yahoo!的楊致遠,致函小股東,解釋拒絕Microsoft的收購建議,理由是作價太低。這一點,可以理解。畢竟,誰都看得出Microsoft手上鈔票多的是,作為賣家,少不免要討價還價一番。不過,楊致遠公開了董事會決定之後,隨即有小股東入稟,要求Yahoo!的董事會,認真考慮Microsoft的收購建議。

雖然楊致遠說,Yahoo!是首屈一指的入門網站,也是網上廣告的最大平台,更在中國和日本勝過對手,加上手上廿億現金,不過,那些都是過去的陳述,對未來,Yahoo!似乎仍然未有任何方向。

Yahoo!現在的所謂Starting Point Objective,也就是要上網的人以Yahoo!作為首頁,根本不是一個甚麼策略。改改首頁,只不過是幾個Click的距離。難道楊致遠真的認為,網民真的十年如一日?

其實Yahoo!不是完全沒有過人之處;它的網上小工具,如Mail,雖然沒有Google的破格,但偏偏做得平易近人,所以仍大受歡迎。成功不用走得太前,只要不斷地貼群眾,這一點,Yahoo!在微細處把握得非常準確,可是偏偏在大策略上,就顯得進退失據。

始終,Yahoo!要生存下去,不外乎三條路︰搜尋器、提供資訊、網上工具。

若當年Yahoo!用了Google,今天也不會落得如此田地,Yahoo!要走搜尋器之路,遲了七年。至於提供資訊嘛,對不起,仍然是廣告收入主導,BacktoSquareOne。說到底,沒有廣告收入,Yahoo!沒有希望;而Microsoft也講得明白,Google將會一市獨大。

要是Yahoo!要靠提供網上工具來維生,卻想不出廣告以外的收入模式,也只會是死路一條;況且,網上工具是場多邊混戰,就連Microsoft也打得吃力,Yahoo!可以獨力應付嗎?Yahoo!有能力搞收費服務嗎?

Yahoo!的反應,Microsoft早已計算在內,且看兇狠的美國律師,會如何繼續打下去。

2007年2月15日刊於《蘋果日報》

悔婚和危險關係

Yahoo!和Microsoft門當戶對,雙方既是不同時代的象徵,由去年Project Panama雙方開始拍拖,至今談婚論嫁,更開宗明義是要令Google難為,正路是頭條的材料,可惜浸淫在後現代的情慾橫流之中,都成了花邊新聞。

俱往矣。反正Yahoo!嫌棄禮金單薄;而Microsoft在宣佈提出收購後,蒸發了的市值,也近400億,幾乎是禮金總數的九成。當然,Microsoft股價下挫,間接令現金加股票的禮金貶值,Yahoo!悔婚,不算新聞。世紀婚禮談不攏,不打緊,Microsoft早已在另一邊廂獨自精采。

Microsoft娶了Danger,Inc.,並會將它安置在Entertainment & Devices,也就是搞Xbox和Zune的那一房;而Danger推出的Sidekick,在美國有不錯的Buzz,正好為人丁單薄的這房喜。

更重要的是,蘋果的iPhone將MacOSX帶到尋常百姓家,誰都知手機是當下兵家必爭之地。

Google旗下的Android,更是衝流動互聯網平台而來的OS。至今,Microsoft最成功的主打,仍然是OS。而這宗危險關係,明顯是為了延續Microsoft的一貫策略︰由佔據PC的OS制高點,擴展到流動互聯網平台OS的影響力。

話說回頭,Danger的創辦人Rubin,被摒出門外之後,另起爐灶搞Android,如今成為了Google現在最有潛力的後。Danger這個小家碧玉,說不定更好生養,更能為Microsoft開枝散葉。

2007年2月14日刊於《蘋果日報》

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